Focused on network reconnaissance, eavesdropping, and DoS attacks caused by static routing policies, this paper designs a random routing mutation architecture based on the OpenFlow protocol, which takes advantages of the global network view and centralized control in a software-defined network. An entropy matrix of network traffic characteristics is constructed by using volume measurements and characteristic measurements of network traffic. Random routing mutation is triggered according to the result of network anomaly detection, which using a wavelet transform and principal component analysis to handle the above entropy matrix for both spatial and temporal correlations. The generation of a random routing path is specified as a 0-1 knapsack problem, which is calculated using an improved ant colony algorithm. Theoretical analysis and simulation results show that the proposed method not only increases the difficulty of network reconnaissance and eavesdropping but also reduces the impact of DoS attacks on the normal communication in an SDN network.
Introduction
The static nature of current computing systems gives attackers a valuable and asymmetric advantage for planning and launching attacks effectively. Moving Target Defense (MTD) has emerged as a promising approach consisting of a number of mechanisms that automatically change one or more system properties to make the system's attack surface unpredictable to adversaries. Increased uncertainty and complexity will increase the costs of malicious probing and attack efforts. As a result, network intrusion is prevented or at least limited. MTD technology has created a rich body of research thus far.
According to the differences of a machine's functioning environment, MTD mechanisms are divided into five categories: the data level, the program level, the operation system level, the network level and the platform level. We focus on just network level MTD in this paper. The Networkbased Moving Target Defense (NMTD) policy randomizes properties of the network, including IP addresses, MAC addresses, port numbers, and even the communication routing and protocol [1] . Software-Defined Network (SDN) decouples the control plane and data plane, making the network management and expansion more flexible. However, security is becoming a key factor, which restricts the development of SDN. Thus, how to enhance the defense capabilities of SDN by taking advantages of its own feature is one of the most important problems. Meanwhile, the programmable and flexible nature of SDN makes the implementation of MTD mechanisms more practical and customizable [2] in SDN.
Therefore, this paper proposes a Random Routing Mutation (RRM) method by referencing the idea of MTD and taking advantage of the global network view and centralized control in SDN. So-called RRM changes the data transmission routing dynamically based on the premise of the integrity of a communication session. An RRM engine on the SDN controller is developed to select an optimal routing path according to the network traffic state and security state. An optimal routing path is the path that has a minimal number of overlapping nodes compared to the recently used routing paths. In addition, the optimal routing path must meet the load balancing needs of the entire network.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2, related works are discussed. The RRM defense architecture and its workflow are designed in Sect. 3. Section 4 describes the routing mutation trigger mode based on the result of network traffic anomaly detection. Section 5 presents the routing path generation method based on an improved ant colony algorithm. In Sect. 6, we give a random routing path update scheme. Effectiveness analysis and simulation experiments for the proposed method are conducted in Sect. 7. Section 8 concludes the paper.
Related Work
NMTD research has been classified into two categories according to different network environments: traditional and SDN networks. We will elaborate existing NMTD mechanisms in both traditional and SDN networks.
The Dynamic Network Address Translation (DYNAT) work proposed by Kewley et al. [3] created a system by modifying the source and destination hosts to translate network addresses in a coordinated manner. Sifalakis et al. [4] obscured the data exchange between two peers by shuffling the communication participants that define the sequence for address hopping and determine data spreading. Atighetchi et al. [5] created a system that allows hosts to use tunnels to disguise on-going communication, which requires Copyright c 2017 The Institute of Electronics, Information and Communication Engineers participation from both end-points. Badishi et al. [6] proposed a random port-hopping scheme to defend against DDoS attacks by changing the communication ports. Dunlop et al. [7] developed a Moving Target IPv6 Defense (MT6D) that leverages the immense address space of IPv6, which can maintain user privacy and protect against targeted network attacks by repeatedly rotating the addresses of both the sender and receiver. Morrell et al. [8] modified the MT6D protocol, leveraging a distributed hash tablebased blind rendezvous scheme. By reducing the amount of data shared between hosts down to simply a public key, the approach simplified the distribution of MTD configuration information and reduced the risk of compromising said data. Al-Shaer et al. [9] presented an architecture called mutable networks for MTD. The main goal was to restrain an attacker's capability in scanning or discovering target networks by dynamically changing network configurations, such as IP addresses and routings. The above-mentioned NMTD methods are all deployed in traditional networks. However, implementing NMTD policies in traditional networks requires the reconfiguration and synchronization of network devices, which not only interrupts ongoing communication sessions but also exhibits low efficiency and high cost.
Researchers have also proposed various MTD mechanisms in SDN networks. Jafarian et al. [10] used the OpenFlow protocol to develop an MTD architecture that transparently mutates IP addresses with high unpredictability, which is able to maintain configuration integrity and minimize operation overhead. Jafarian et al. [11] also presented a novel MTD technique that enables the host-to-IP binding of each destination host to vary randomly across the network based on the source identity and time. The integration of both spatial and temporal mutations could effectively defeat various reconnaissance-based threat models, ranging from naive IP sharing techniques to sophisticated advanced persistent threats. Kampanakis et al. [2] demonstrated how a highly programmable SDN could offer various avenues to provide obfuscations, which increases the cost of an attack by requiring the attacker to expend more resources studying the attack surface. In addition, some researchers have proposed RRM mechanisms. Qi et al. [12] not only offered an efficient practical RRM that considers flow and network constraints for general networks, but also used Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMT) to discover a set of random constraint-satisfying routings. Analysis and simulation show that RRM can protect at least 90% of the packet flow from being attacked by realistic attackers compared with static routing [12] . The core idea of literature [13] was similar to that of literature [12] , and it also took link security and defense benefits into consideration and used game theory to explore the routing requirements of data streams. However, both literature [12] and [13] treated the maximum number of overlapping nodes in different routing paths as a constraint that reduced the spatial randomness of routing mutation. Moreover, a fixed mutation cycle reduces the temporal randomness of routing mutation. Gillani et al. [14] migrated virtual routers among multiple paths to invalidate the network topology probe of attacks, and therefore link DDoS attacks could be resisted. Zhao et al. [15] proposed an SDN-based Double Hopping Communication (DHC) approach that changes both communication ends and routing paths dynamically. DHC was able to increase the overhead of a sniffer attack, as well as the difficulty of communication data recovery. However, it only considers traffic overload of a single node when generating a routing path and is prone to traffic congestion.
In conclusion, RRM is an effective method that can defend against reconnaissance, eavesdropping, and DoS attacks. However, there are still the following problems: (1) existing RRM approaches make it difficult to search for an optimal mutation routing path effectively and thus cannot guarantee the best unpredictability compared with the recently used routing paths; and (2) routing mutation based on a fixed mutation cycle lacks dynamism and cannot adjust routing paths immediately if there is an attack in SDN. Actually, we mainly resolve problems of how and when to apply routing mutation in SDN to increase spatial randomness and temporal randomness simultaneously.
Architecture of Random Routing Mutation

Overall Architecture
The RRM architecture, shown in Fig. 1 , is based on the typical implementation style of an SDN network: a controller, the OpenFlow protocol and OpenFlow switches. The SDN controller not only gathers real-time status information from OpenFlow switches but also describes the topology of the entire network. The Random Routing Mutation Engine (RRME) sets up the entropy matrix of network traffic characteristics based on the obtained information of every switch. Network anomalies are detected based on the constructed entropy matrix. Routing mutation is triggered immediately if an abnormal value is more than the pre-defined abnormal threshold. Otherwise, routing mutation is triggered after a mutation cycle. A new routing path is generated by RRME with the constraints of both routing path randomness and network load balancing. It should be noted that other constraints can also be added flexibly. A mutation routing path update is completed by sending flow table rules to and installing them on the corresponding switches.
Workflow
The work process of the RRM architecture based on the OpenFlow protocol includes the following four steps:
1) Information collection
The controller obtains the global network topology using the link layer discovery protocol and sends a port state request message to each switch at certain timing. Each switch sends back a port state reply message once it has received the port state request message. The port state reply message records the data information flow through the switch, mainly including the data packet header and velocity information.
2) Routing mutation trigger Routing mutation is triggered by network anomalies, which are detected based on the anomaly detection algorithm proposed in Sect. 4. Random routing path generation and update actions are then triggered if there is an anomaly in the network.
3) Routing path generate Mutation routing is generated using the algorithm of random routing path generation proposed in Sect. 5, which is based on the obtained network topology and traffic information.
4) Routing path update RRME sends and installs new flow table rules in switches that are included in the mutation routing path in reverse order. Moreover, old flow rules associated with the data flow in switches are deleted. The detailed process of mutation routing path update will be described in Sect. 6.
The proposed RRM in this paper can adjust the routing path of an abnormal flow quickly and accurately according to the network topology, traffic distribution and safety state. Due to the centralized control of switches in an SDN network, mutation from one routing to another can be accomplished as a series of flow table rules update in switches, along both the old and new routing paths. This has little impact on the existing normal communication due to its low cost.
Effectiveness Analysis
To evaluate RRM's effectiveness against attackers, Routing Mutation Effectiveness (RME) is defined as the average percentage of packets in a flow that do not pass through any intermediate nodes that are being eavesdropped on or compromised.
We assume that an attacker can compromise limited number of nodes, which he believes to be critical. This is because the attacker has finite resource and must avoid being detected. Once the attacker has compromised one node in the routing path, he would stay on the node to launch a eavesdropping or DoS attack in remain time. Meanwhile, we suppose the adversary is aware of the deployment of RRM in a target SDN network. The attacker is able to mutate in every interval when the routing path mutation is trigged, which means the attacker is synchronous with the defender.
Suppose the defender aims to transmit a flow f between a given pair of source and destination nodes. The network consists of n nodes. The attacker's capability, denoted as c, is defined in terms of the number of nodes that are compromised by the attacker (c ≤ n). The number of routing paths of length i is denoted as d i . The flow is transmitted during M mutation intervals such that a 1/M portion of f is transmitted during each interval.
The probability that a routing path is compromised equals the probability that at least one node in the routing path is compromised. L denotes the maximum length of routes in terms of the number of nodes. k denotes the mutation sequence ( 
denotes the total number of routing paths. Suppose the adversary mutates in every interval, which is synchronous with the defender. If the adversary compromises one node in a routing path, he will stay in the node to launch a eavesdropping or DoS attack all the rest time. In other words, the node compromise probability is declined as AC in the k-th mutation cycle. 1 − (1 − AC) i denotes the probability that one routing path whose length is i is compromised in the k-th mutation cycle. Thus, RME can be denoted as:
Routing Mutation Trigger Mode Based on Network Traffic Anomaly Detection
Network anomalies are sudden, unpredictable and complex. They often change characteristics of network traffic, which include not only traffic volume measurements (such as the number of bytes, packets and flows, etc.) but also traffic characteristic measurements (such as source or destination IP, source or destination port, etc.). However, anomaly detection based on traffic volume measurements cannot detect port scanning, network scanning and low-traffic anomalies in transmissions from a single point-to-multipoint, whose traffic volumes do not change significantly. Under that condition, we can only use traffic characteristic measurements to detect anomalies. Additionally, traffic characteristics of different links have relevance [16] . Qian et al. [17] proved the spatialtemporal correlation of different Origin and Destination (OD) flows and noted shortages of anomaly detections that unilaterally consider temporal or spatial correlation. Therefore, we constructed an entropy matrix of traffic characteristics that considers both traffic volume measurements and traffic characteristic measurements. We also referred to the literature [17] to detect network anomalies, which entails conducting multi-scale Principal Component Analysis (PCA) on the constructed entropy matrix.
Entropy Matrix of Traffic Characteristics
Definition 1 (Entropy Matrix of Traffic Characteristics)
The entropy matrix of traffic characteristics represents the change of traffic volume and concentration of traffic characteristics between all the source-destination pairs in the network. The entropy matrix of traffic characteristics can be defined as a t × (u * v)-dimensional matrix and denoted as H t×(u * v) , which indicates that there are u OD flows at time t and that each of them has v traffic measurement attributes. Row x of H t×(u * v) (1 ≤ x ≤ t) is denoted as H(x, :), which represents the traffic in the entire network during the x-th interval. Column y of H t×(u * v) (1 ≤ y ≤ uv) is denoted as H(:, y), which represents the network traffic sequence in the y-th measurement location.
Traffic volume measurements are identical to the traditional traffic matrix. Traffic characteristics measurements are treated as a series of random events. We analyze them according to the definition of information entropy. Assume that a certain traffic characteristic has R attributes in measured data, where characteristic attribute i appears s i times. Then, the definition of information entropy is given as follows.
The real-time and on-line statistics of traffic flow in OpenFlow switches can be obtained from the controller in SDN. Statistics are used to set up the entropy matrix of traffic characteristics. This method has lower cost and greater accuracy compared with traditional networks [18] .
Network Anomaly Detection
The entropy matrix of traffic characteristics is an organization form of network traffic that includes quasi-periodical normal, abnormal and noise components. Effective analysis of each component is the key issue to detect network anomalies. Network anomaly detection based on multi-scale principal component analysis has four steps: (1) normal traffic modeling, (2) subspace construction, (3) abnormal threshold detection and (4) abnormal traffic locating. A detailed description of this anomaly detection algorithm can be found in literature [17] .
It is important to note that the anomaly detection algorithm proposed in literature [17] has the following advantages when used in an SDN network. (1) The entropy matrix of traffic characteristics is easy to obtain and construct. ( 2) The entropy matrix of traffic characteristics reflects not only the network traffic volume measurements but also the traffic characteristic measurements. (3) Multi-scale principal component analysis analyzes not only the time pertinence of network traffic but also the space pertinence of network traffic. (4) This algorithm has low complexity, and the main computational cost is the wavelet transform of the traffic matrix and the principal component analysis of the wavelet coefficients matrix and traffic matrix.
Generation of Routing Paths Based on an Improved Ant Colony Algorithm
The key issue for ensuring MTD effectiveness lies in the unpredictability of mutation routing paths. Thus, random routing paths should not only meet requirements for the common routing algorithm, such as shortest path and load balancing constraints, but also maximize unpredictability between hopping routing paths to achieve the best defensive capability.
Generation of a routing path under multiple constraints is an NP-hard problem [13] . We first specify the problem as a 0-1 knapsack problem. Then, we select an optimal routing path using an improved ant colony algorithm.
Statement of Random Routing Path Generation
Definition 2 (Random Routing Path Generation Problem, RRPGP) The input parameters of RRPGP are (R, H, L, B) . R denotes the network topology. H denotes the entropy matrix of traffic characteristics. L denotes the maximum routing path length. B denotes the load balancing threshold of the network. The output result can be expressed as a Boolean vector U T , which denotes whether the switch node is selected or not. The objective of RRPGP is to select an optimal routing path that satisfies the requirements of both maximum routing path length and load balancing of the entire network.
Definition 3 (Directed Graph, DG) A directed graph G is a two-tuple, that consists of a non-empty finite set V(G) and an ordered pair set E(G) containing elements from V(G). V(G) denotes the node set of graph G, and an element v ∈ V(G) is called a node. E(G) denotes the edge set of graph G and the element e i, j ∈ E is marked as e(v i , v j ) or e i, j = v i v j , which is an ordered pair formed by elements from V(G).
Definition 4 (Path) For node
. . , v k ) is denoted as a path from v 1 to v k , which can also denoted as P = {e i,i+1 | i = 1, 2, . . . , k − 1}.
With the assumption that the network contains n nodes (V = {v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v n }) and m edges (E = {e 1 , e 2 , . . . , e m }), we define a Boolean variable u Unpredictability is depended on the number of overlapping nodes between the new routing path and the recently used routing paths. In order to increase the unpredictability, we should minimize the overlap between the old and the new routing paths. Thus, the objective function of RRPGP can be represented as:
indicates that node v i is selected in two consecutive mutation cycles and that its reusability is 1.
The constraints of RRPGP are described as follows:
Equations (2), (3) and (4) ensure the source node is v s and the destination node is v d , which also guarantee that the numbers of adjacent nodes of the source node and destination node are 1. Equation (5) ensures that there are no cycles in the routing path. Equation (6) ensures that the maximum routing path length is L. Equation (7) considers the current available bandwidth of every link in the entire network to ensure load balancing of the total network. ψ(v i ) denotes the adjacent node set of node v i . q k i, j denotes the available link bandwidth between node v i and node v j in the k-th mutation cycle. q k denotes the current average available bandwidth in the k-th mutation cycle.
k is the standard deviation of all links in the k-th mutation cycle.
α k denotes the bandwidth weight of the routing path in the k-th mutation cycle, which indicates that, the smaller the difference between the available link bandwidth, the less likely congestion is to appear due to bandwidth bottlenecks of a link.
We no longer consider optimal routing path selection with only one link and instead take the available bandwidths of all links in the network into account. As a result, network traffic congestion on local links is avoided. We have only discussed RRM for a single flow within the network at the same time thus far. However, RRM for multiple flows can be similarly defined. In this case there is an additional constraint requiring an upper bound on the number of flows simultaneously transmitted through one switch node. This constraint can be formalized as
g(v i ) denotes a function representing the total number of flows passing through node v i in the k-th mutation cycle. Z is the threshold for this constraint.
Generation of an Optimal Random Routing Path
The ant colony algorithm is suitable for multipoint random search in the solution space of discrete optimization problems. It has been applied to many classical combinatorial optimization problems, such as the Travelling Salesman Problem (TSP) and Quadratic Assignment Problem (QAP). It has been a potential evolutionary algorithm for NP-hard problems. The 0-1 knapsack problem is a classical NP-hard problem in combinatorial optimization. Inspired by literature [19] , we propose an improved ant colony algorithm to compute the optimal routing path. The algorithm procedure is as follows: 1) Initialization.
2) Calculate the probability of each node being selected according to the probability formulas p
. . , n) in the k-th mutation cycle. τ k j (t) denotes the accumulated pheromone in node v j in the k-th mutation cycle. η k ( j) denotes a heuristic function that represents the randomization of node v j in the k-th mutation cycle. A higher value of η k ( j) indicates a higher probability that this node is selected in the k-th mutation cycle. α indicates the influence factor derived from pheromone that sensed by ants in this routing path. β indicates the heuristic factor for ants to explore new routing paths. Each ant a = (1, 2, . . . , s) randomly selects node v h (1 ≤ h ≤ n) as part of a routing path.
• Calculation of τ
After m moments, the ant finishes a cycle and the concentration of pheromone in node v j is adjusted according to the equation τ Q is a constant and L i a denotes the total number of nodes walked by the a-th ant in the k-th mutation cycle.
• Calculation of η k ( j)
The number of times that node v j appears in the top k-1 mutation cycle is represented as
ϕ is a space regulator factor that indicates that, the more times node v j appears in the top k-1 mutation cycle, the smaller the probability is that node v j is selected again in the k-th mutation cycle. Equation f (k) is a monotone increasing function. ψ is a time regulator factor that indicates that, the more recently node v j has been selected, the lower the probability is of node v j being selected again.
3) An independent solution is constructed for each ant. Add a temporary vector temp k ( j), whose initial value equals p k j . Here, ε k = ε k − temp k (h) and temp k (h) = 0. The a-th ant stakes according to the roulette wheel ε k and then selects the next node v j ; here, ε k = ε k − temp k ( j) and temp k ( j) = 0. If the constraints are satisfied when node v j is inserted into the routing path, we do so and denote it as u k,a j = 1. Otherwise, we cannot insert node v j into the routing path and thus u k,a j = 0. Repeat these steps until the ant has tested all routing paths. 4) If all the s ants have constructed their solutions, then proceed to (5); otherwise, return to (3). 5) Find the ant whose randomness is best in this generation and update the global pheromones according to the equation
6) If all of the constraints are satisfied, the optimal solution is presented. Otherwise, we should set GEN = GEN +1 (GEN represents the iteration time) and return to (2) . If GEN > max GEN or the current solution has been stable, we will stop the entire process.
A feasible solution formed by the a-th ant in the k-th mutation cycle is represented as a Boolean vector
The improved ant colony algorithm has the following characteristics. (1) Both probability and search randomness are taken into account using a roulette wheel, which can solve the drawback of the traditional ant colony algorithm being liable to get stuck in local optimal solutions. (2) The search time is shorter compared with the traditional ant colony algorithm. This is because the calculation time of each probability ρ k j is n, while it is m * n * (n − 1)/2 in the traditional ant colony algorithm. (3) The inspired factor η k ( j) contributes to the convergence of the routing mutation randomness.
Routing Path Update
A routing path must be changed when an abnormal flow is detected. New flow forwarding rules are generated by RRME and sent to switches included in the new routing path. However, there are many flow forwarding rules that need to be updated simultaneously in the corresponding switches. As a result, the problem of inconsistency has emerged for routing path update. Considering the switches in a routing path as a sequence, we take the "adding new rules with opposite sequence, and then removing old rules with order sequence" principle to update flow tables. Specifically, 1) RRME calculates new route path information and sends it to the controller.
2) The controller sends and installs flow table rules into switches in the new routing path according to the order from the destination node to the source node. Additionally, the controller sets the idle time as the mutation cycle.
3) If there is a joint switch between the old and the new routing paths, we replace the old flow table rules with the new flow table rules directly. Otherwise, we delete the old flow table rules in the order of the destination node to the source node when the update of the inlet switch is finished and wait for the long end-to-end delay of the entire network.
The routing path update process ensures the consistency of the flow table rule update, preventing any interruption of existing communication and additional load on the controller.
Experiment and Analysis
To evaluate the performance of our proposed approach, we have operated our implemented prototype over Mininet 2.0. OpenFlow 1.0 is applied, and Floodlight is used as the controller. The following experiments will be carried out to verify the effectiveness of routing mutation from the perspectives of attacker capabilities, network size, mutation cycle and controller load. The parameter values of the improved ant colony algorithm are s = 2n, α = 1, β = 1, ρ = 0.5, λ = 0.8, Q = 1, ϕ = 0.2, ψ = 0.5, f (k) = k, and max GEN = 50. The entropy matrix of traffic characteristics includes traffic volumes (numbers of bytes and packets) and traffic characteristics (source and destination IP, source and destination port).
(
1) Effectiveness of RRM with different number of compromised nodes
Brite tool is used to generate a Waxman random network with 100 nodes. The maximum length of routing paths is set to 5. To simulate different attack abilities, we randomly select 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90 , and 100 nodes from the network to be compromised nodes at the initial time. One compromised node in the previous mutation interval is removed in the next mutation interval. Routing paths are generated using our proposed algorithm and the algorithm in literature [13] . A data file whose size is 100MB is divided into M (M = 4, 8) intervals to transmit. Additionally, Wireshark is used to capture and analyze packets at each compromised node. The experimental results are shown in Fig. 2 . The horizontal coordinate denotes the proportion of compromised nodes out of the total network nodes. The vertical coordinate denotes the value of RME.
Note (1) that RRM is effective against network eavesdropping compared with the scheme of no mutation, and (2) that the RME of our proposed approach is similar to that of literature [13] , and (3) that the faster the frequency of mutation is, the better the defense result is. This is because the attacker can intercept a smaller number of packets if the frequency of mutation is faster.
2) Effectiveness of RRM with different numbers of network nodes
Brite tool is used to generate Waxman random networks with 100, 150, 200, 250, 300, 350, 400, 450, and 500 nodes. 50 nodes are randomly selected in every network to simulate the attacker's compromised nodes. A data file whose size is 100MB is divided into M (M = 4) intervals to transmit. The maximum length of routing paths is set to 5, 10, and 15. Wireshark is used to capture and analyze packets at the selected 50 compromised node. The experimental results are shown in Fig. 3 . The horizontal coordinate denotes the different numbers of network nodes. The vertical coordinate denotes the value of RME.
Note (1) that the proportion of compromised nodes in the network declines when the total number of network nodes increases. As a result, RME is improved. Also note that (2) with the decrease of the routing path length, the probability of the attacker matching the correct transmission routing path grows smaller. The overlap probability of the nodes gets smaller, and as a result, the RRM effectiveness is improved.
(3) Performance of anti-DoS attacks A DoS attack consumes computing and storage resources of network nodes or/and occupies bandwidth of network links, which can lead to the increase of network transmission delay and even the failure of network transmission. Thus, we use transmission delay to evaluate the performance of anti-DoS attacks. Brite tool is used to generate a Waxman random network with 100 nodes. Two nodes are randomly selected from the 100 nodes as source and destination nodes. Nodes in routing path, which is calculated by using shortest path first algorithm, are the DoS attack targets. The mutation routing path is calculated using our proposed algorithm and the algorithm in literature [13] . An SYN FLOOD attack is launched, and the transmission delay is recorded. The experimental results are shown in Fig. 4 . The horizontal coordinate denotes the average of attack rate. The vertical coordinate denotes the data transmission time.
Note (1) that, compared with the static routing policy, RRM increases the difficulty of launching a DoS attack, and (2) that our proposed approach is better than that of literature [13] for the anti-DoS attack performance. This is because routing mutation is trigged immediately if a network anomaly is detected in our proposed approach. Data transmission will be transferred by the new routing path, which can reduce the effect of the DoS attack. In comparison, routing mutation is not trigged until the mutation cycle ends in literature [13] , even if there is a network anomaly. Note (1) that, compared with the static routing policy, RRM increases the transmission delay. This is because optimal routing path selection and flow table update consume a certain amount of time. Also note (2) that transmission delay of our proposed algorithm is less than that in literature [13] . This is because the global network load balancing is taken into consideration in our proposed algorithm. Finally, note (3) that the transmission delay increases when the frequency of mutation increases. This is because the routing selection and flow table update consume more time when the frequency of mutation increases.
(5) Solution time of the improved ant colony algorithm for multiple flows
Brite tool is used to generate a Waxman random network with 100 nodes and the number of flows in the network is set to 5, 10, and 15. The solution time of the improved ant colony algorithm for routing selection in a network with Z flows is shown in Fig. 6 . The horizontal coordinate denotes the maximum allowed flows for every routing node. The vertical coordinate denotes the solution time of the improved ant colony algorithm.
Note (1) that the solution time of the improved ant colony algorithm for routing selection increases when the number of flows increases and (2) that the solution time of the improved ant colony algorithm for routing selection decreases when the allowed number of flows in one routing node increases. This is because there are more possible satisfying solutions when the allowed number of flows in one routing node is increased.
Meanwhile, the maximum allowed flows for every routing node should increase if the number of flows increasing in the SDN, which guarantee to find a satiable solution. Then, a number of flows will transmit through one routing node simultaneously. A deliberate attacker will try to compromise the routing node which is used to transmit more flows to intercept more packets. The total number of compromised packets increases because of the increasing of the flows number. However, the percentage of compromised packets in a flow is stable, which is not affected by the increasing of the flows number.
(6) Performance of the SDN controller with different routing mutation cycles Brite tool is used to generate a Waxman random net- Note (1) that compared with the static routing policy, RRM obviously increases the load of the SDN controller, and (2) that the shorter the mutation cycle is, the higher the CPU utilization of the SDN controller is. This is because the routing selection and update increase the load of the controller. It seems that increasing the number of controllers in the SDN network is a potential approach to relieve the load on the controller. Each controller would manage a segment of the SDN network.
Conclusion
SDN is a new network architecture with immature technology and numerous security risks. The security of SDN has become a focus of study in the field of network security. In this paper, we first propose an RRM architecture based on the OpenFlow protocol. Then, we construct an entropy matrix of network traffic characteristics and detect network anomalies. Routing mutation is triggered based on anomaly detection results. New routing paths are generated using an improved ant colony algorithm, which increases the unpredictability of the routing mutation. Experiments and security argumentation demonstrate that this method can effectively defend against reconnaissance, eavesdropping, and DoS attacks.
One drawback of our proposed approach is the increased burden on the controller in SDN. For future work, we plan to develop more than one controller to manage an SDN network and improve the scalability of RRM.
